

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1330

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

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USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 0605

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T - P A R A N B R E D 8 L I N E O N E

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AGREED TEXT OF JANUARY
24 PLENARY STATEMENT

THE AD HOC GROUP ON JANUARY 23 APPROVED THE TEXT
OF A WESTERN STATEMENT TO BE DELIVERED ON BEHALF OF
ALLIES AT PLENARY SESSION JANUARY 24 BY U.S. REP

BEGIN TEXT:

1. MR. CHAIRMAN, YOU WILL RECALL THAT DURING OUR MEETING
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OF 17 JANUARY MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE URGED PARTICIPANTS TO

FOCUS ON THOSE THINGS WHICH COULD MOST READILY BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE BASIC SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. MY COLLEAGUES AND I CONSIDER THAT REDUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IS THE BEST WAY FOR ALL OF US HERE TO START MOVING TOWARDS THIS OBJECTIVE.

2. THE PAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY HAS SEEN A NUMBER OF CRISES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS IS ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS WE ARE ALL HERE. EVERY CRISIS CARRIES WITH IT THE DANGER OF ESCALATION. THE MOST DANGEROUS CRISES HAVE BEEN THOSE INVOLVING, AT LEAST POTENTIALLY, THE FORCES OF SO-CALLED "SUPER-POWERS"; THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WHICH RESULTED IN LOWERING THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS CONFRONTING EACH OTHER IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS MAKING DETENTE REAL AND MEASURABLE. THIS IS ONE REASON WHY IT MAKES EXCELLENT SENSE TO DEAL FIRST IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GROUND FORCES OF THESE TWO POWERS.

3. INDEED, AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO IMPROVED RELATIONS BOTH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR AND BETWEEN ALL PARTICIPANTS.

4. THE ENTERPRISE IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED IS A DELICATE ONE. ALL PARTICIPANTS WISH TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY. IT IS, AFTER ALL, OUR TASK TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND WE MUST NOT ALLOW THEM TO BE WEAKENED BY ILL-CONSIDERED MEASURES. ONE REASON WHY THE WESTERN PHASE ONE PROPOSAL IS A PRACTICAL APPROACH IS THAT TO WITHDRAW SOME U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES FROM THE AREA WOULD RAISE FEWER POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AT THE OUTSET OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAN TO REDUCE OTHER FORCES. THEREFORE, A WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES IS A GOOD WAY TO BEGIN. REACHING AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WILL ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AMONG ALL PARTICIPANTS. WE COULD THEN TACKLE IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS THE MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF INCLUDING REDUCTIONS OF FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

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5. THE INTENTION TO REDUCE U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IS -- AS FAR AS IT GOES -- COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US. THE APPROACHES OF BOTH SIDES, DESPITE THEIR DIFFERENCES IN OTHER RESPECTS, CALL FOR SUCH REDUCTIONS. WHY NOT, THEN, PROCEED FROM THIS COMMON ELEMENT AND TRY TO REACH SOME MEASURE OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THIS TOPIC?

6. BOTH SIDES ARE ALSO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD WORK HARD AND

STEADILY TO REACH AGREEMENT. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY THE EASTERN SIDE THAT WE TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT BY 1975, AND THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE HAS RECENTLY URGED THAT WE "REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS" TO SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS. LET US, THEN, SEEK OUT THE SIMPLEST AND MOST PRACTICAL APPROACH. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF REACHING AGREEMENT IN THE SHORTEST TIME. TO DEAL WITH U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES FIRST PROVIDES THE MEANS OF DOING THIS.

7. PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT UPON A SHARED FEELING OF NOT BEING FACED WITH THE RISK OF A POSSIBLE ATTACK. REDUCTIONS OF FORCES WILL NOT IN THEMSELVES NECESSARILY CONTRIBUTE TO A MUTUAL FEELING OF GREATER SECURITY. INDEED, REDUCTIONS WHICH DO NOT TAKE PROPERLY INTO ACCOUNT EXISTING DISPARITIES WOULD HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT. PARTICIPANTS MUST AIM TO ACHIEVE, NOT MERELY LOWER FORCE LEVELS, BUT LOWER PERCEIVED RISKS OF POSSIBLE ATTACK. IN THIS CONNECTION, WHEN EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE USED THE TERM "MILITARY DETENTE" IN THEIR PRESENTATIONS, WE ASSUME THEY MEANT BY THAT A SENSE OF LESSER MILITARY CAPABILITIES IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

8. THE LARGE SOVIET TANK FORMATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE WEST. WE ARE NOT DISCUSSING INTENTIONS OR THE MOTIVES FOR ORIGINALLY PLACING THOSE TANKS THERE; WE ARE DISCUSSING THE OBJECTIVE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACTUAL PRESENCE OF SO MANY TANKS FOR STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEIR PRESENCE OBLIGES THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENSE MATTERS ON THE WESTERN SIDE TO ASK THEMSELVES

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

THE DIRECT QUESTION: HOW MIGHT THESE TANKS BE USED IN A
CRISIS?

9. THE RESPONSIBLE WESTERN OFFICIALS CANNOT FAIL TO BEAR
IN MIND THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT TANKS ARE A MOST FORMIDABLE
WEAPONS OF GROUND COMBAT. TANKS ARE, IN FACT, THE MAIN
STRIKE FORCE OF A MODERN GROUND ARMY. FOR MILITARY PUPOSES,
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT ONLY THE LARGE OVERALL NUMBER OF TANKS
ON THE EASTERN SIDE, BUT ALSO THEIR LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONAL
CONCENTRATION WHICH IS RELEVANT. THE PRESENT CONCENTRATION
OF WARSAW PACT TANKS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS WITHOUT PARALLEL
IN PEACETIME: THERE ARE 15,500 OF THEM. LARGE NUMBERS OF
THESE TANKS ARE GROUPED INTO TWO SOVIET TANK ARMIES STATIONED
IN GDR: FOR CLARITY I WILL IDENTIFY THEM AS THE THIRD
SHOCK ARMY AND THE FIRST GUARDS TANK ARMY.

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10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE HUGE DISPARITY IN TANKS BETWEEN
EAST AND WEST IN THE AREA -- THERE IS A RATIO OF TWO AND A
HALF TO ONE IN FAVOR OF THE EAST -- CAN THERE BE ANY WONDER
THAT THE CONCENTRATION OF SOVIET TANKS INTO TWO TANK ARMIES
IN THE GDR GIVES RISE TO A JUSTIFIED APPREHENSION ON THE
PART OF THE WEST? INDEED, MAY NOT THIS TANK CONCENTRATION
BE AN ANACHRONISM IN TODAY'S EUROPE? RECENT YEARS HAVE
SEEN A NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES RELATING TO
CENTRAL EUROPE. I REFER, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE PERLIN AGREEMENT
AND TO THE RECENT BILATERAL TREATIES BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE USSR, POLAND, THE GDR AND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IS THE MAINTENANCE OF A HEAVY PREPONDERANCE
OF TANKS AND GROUND FORCES ON THE EASTERN SIDE REALLY NEEDED,
GIVEN THE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
ARISING OUT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS?

11. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF A SPECIFIC
SOVIET TANK ARMY FROM THE GDR, CONSISTING OF FIVE DIVISIONS,
68,000 MEN, AND 1,700 TANKS. THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL OF A

SOVIET TANK ARMY, IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING WITH A SPECIAL STATUS, WOULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY AND HENCE TO A GENERAL SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT WOULD BE A CONCRETE DEMONSTRATION OF A GENUINE INTEREST IN THE SUBSTANCE OF DETENTE AND NOT JUST THE APPEARANCE.

12. FOR ITS PART, THE WEST HAS PROPOSED THE WITHDRAWAL OF 29,000 U.S. SOLDIERS. THIS REPRESENTS THE SAME PERCENTAGE OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THESE U.S. AND SOVIET WITHDRAWALS IMPLEMENTED IN THE MANNER WE HAVE PROPOSED, WOULD CONSTITUTE THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS WHOSE OUTCOME IS FAIR TO BOTH SIDES.

13. THE MANPOWER DISPARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES -- NOT TO SPEAK OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN WESTERN GROUND FORCES AS A WHOLE AND EASTERN GROUND FORCES AS A WHOLE -- IS SO GREAT THAT ONLY LARGER REDUCTIONS BY THE EAST CAN LEAD TOWARD AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME AND BE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARDS ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OVERALL COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.
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14. THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE WEST WOULD NOT GIVE THE WEST A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE EASTERN SIDE THROUGH ITS PROPOSAL. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD BRING THE GROUND FORCES OF BOTH SIDES CLOSER TO PARITY. THIS IS A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO ANY LASTING AGREEMENT ON THE EAST-WEST SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT WOULD NEITHER BE FAIR NOR REALISTIC TO ASK THE WEST TO ENTER INTO AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENSHRINE EXISTING DISADVANTAGES. BECAUSE THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD DO THIS, IT IS THE EASTERN APPROACH, NOT THE WESTERN ONE, WHICH WOULD ENHANCE THE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES OF THE EASTERN SIDE.

15. THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS BY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT DO AWAY WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES WHICH BENEFIT THE EASTERN SIDE. THESE ADVANTAGES WILL OF COURSE REMAIN CONSTANT. THEY ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CHANGE. NO DOUBT THE EASTERN SIDE TAKES THEM FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IN ITS OWN CALCULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE WEST FOR ITS PART MUST DO THE SAME.

16. U.S. FORCES HAVE MUCH FURTHER TO GO WHEN WITHDRAWN THAN SOVIET FORCES. THEY HAVE TO CROSS THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, NEARLY 8 TIMES THE DISTANCE SOVIET FORCES HAVE TO GO TO

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REACH THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THAT REASON, IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO RETURN U.S. FORCES SHOULD THE NEED EVER ARISE. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CENTRAL EUROPE ARE LONGER AND MORE VALNERABLE THAN LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO CENTRAL EUROPE. ON THE OTHER HAND, NUMEROUS ALTERNATIVE LAND AND AIR ROUTES ARE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

17. THE DISPARITY IN RETURN TIMES FOR FORCES WITHDRAWN, IS NOT THE ONLY FACTOR TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE TOTAL REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. WHO CAN DOUBT THAT ITS GEOGRAPHIC POSITION CONFERS A CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE ON THE SOVIET UNION WITH RESPECT TO THE EASE WITH WHICH IT CAN MOVE FORCES INTO CENTRAL EUROPE?

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18. THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY HAS PARTICULAR EFFECT IN THE CASE OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, TO MOVE TANKS FROM THE UNITED STATES OVERSEAS TO CENTRAL EUROPE IS A FAR MORE DIFFICULT PROPOSITION THAN TO MOVE TANKS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OVERLAND A SHORTER DISTANCE INTO CENTRAL EUROPE.

19. MY COLLEAGUES AND I ARE HIGHLIGHTING THESE BASIC UNDERLYING FACTORS IN THE DISCUSSION HERE SO THAT YOU WILL APPRECIATE THE RATIONALE FOR OUR PROPOSAL AND SEE WHY IT IS JUSTIFIED. IT IS EQUITABLE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUMERICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES, FOR THE UNITED STATES TO WITHDRAW A SMALLER NUMBER OF SOLDIERS THAN THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS EQUITABLE, IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DISPARITIES, TO PERMIT U.S. SOLDIERS TO BE WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS. IT IS EQUITABLE THAT THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED AND MAINTAINED WITHIN THE AREA. TO REFUSE THESE PROVISIONS WOULD WEIGHT THE EFFECT OF REDUCTIONS IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT WOULD DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY AND INCREASE THE ADVANTAGES WHICH THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY ENJOYS BY VIRTUE OF ITS PROXIMITY TO CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS IMPORTANT -- AND IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL -- THAT AMERICAN WITHDRAWALS FROM CENTRAL EUROPE NOT BE OF A SIZE AND TYPE THAT MIGHT PROVE DESTABILIZING.

20. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IS FAIR BECAUSE IT TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE DISPARITIES IN A WAY WHICH DOES NOT PLACE EITHER SIDE AT A DISADVANTAGE.

21. IN PARTICULAR, THE SECURITY OF THE EASTERN SIDE WOULD NOT BE DIMINISHED BY ANY CONCEIVABLE JUDGMENT SINCE THE EAST WOULD RETAIN MORE THAN AMPLE DEFENSE CAPABILITY AFTER THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED. IT WOULD APPEAR WHOLLY FEASIBLE FOR THE EAST TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DEFENSES WITH A TANK RATIO IN ITS FAVOR OF LESS THAN THE PRESENT 2.5 TO 1.

22. OUR PROPOSAL WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER SECURITY: A SIGNIFICANT MARGIN OF SUPERIORITY IN TANKS ON ONE SIDE IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO STABILITY, SINCE ITS EXISTENCE MAY BE AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR IN A CRISIS, THUS POTENTIALLY THREATENING THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE.

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23. U.S. AND SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT AS PROPOSED BY US WOULD FACILITATE THE NEGOTIATION OF A SECOND PHASE REDUCTION INCLUDING THE

FORCES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

24. MR. CHAIRMAN, ANY SATISFACTORY PROPOSAL FOR THE
REDUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE MUST
DEAL WITH THE BASIC PROBLEMS I HAVE OUTLINED TODAY. THE
WESTERN PROPOSAL DOES THIS. WE INVITE A DIALOGUE ON IT.

END TEXT. HUMES

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